Arendt's political theology:from political religion to profanation by Diken, Bulent & Laustsen, Carsten Bagge
 1 
ARENDT’S POLITICAL THEOLOGY – FROM POLITICAL 
RELIGION TO PROFANATION 
 
 
 
 
Hence it is necessary for a prince wishing to hold his own to know how to do 
wrong... (Machiavelli 2015: chapter XV, p. 48) 
 
 
In Between Past and Future Arendt reflects over Machiavelli as a figure of transition that 
marks the threshold of our time. With Machiavelli is born the idea of the political and 
freedom, of political freedom. The religious and the political are severed from each other, 
and a space for human freedom and action is opened up. The Prince was no longer to govern 
in order to reach God-given goals but follow his own virtu. With Machiavelli, politics is 
about ‘to learn not to be good’ (Arendt 1977:137). Machiavelli does not advice the Prince to 
be vicious, only to act independently of the Church and follow the logic of the political rather 
the religious. 
There is however an ambiguity here which regards freedom. Freedom was for Machiavelli 
the freedom to found a state. It is after having determined this that Arendt (1977:139) 
compares Machiavelli with Robespierre and Lenin. All three ‘revolutionary’ figures 
legitimized violence referring to the fact that one may kill in order to found a republic 
(Arendt 1977:139). In other words, freedom is a double-edged sword: it gives man the ability 
to act freely, but it also makes possible a violence of new dimensions. Terror is, in this sense, 
a modern phenomenon.   
That Machiavelli is the thinker of freedom and violence is for Arendt an absolutely central 
idea. Nazism, after all, contained a perverted idea of human freedom. Perversion did not only 
consist in its transformation of freedom into an attempt to eliminate the human plurality, but 
also in the fact that with Nazism religion was resurrected as a man-made political religion. 
Secularism made it possible for the human to take the place of God. As God created the 
world out of nothing, man could now create the political community ex nihilio. This logic 
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found a perverted expression in the anti-utilitarian logic of the camps. The camps were the 
manifestation of a political sovereignty, which does not, as in Machiavelli, seek to establish 
a state but which turns certain groups’ extinction into its prime target.  
In this article we elaborate on Arendt’s take on the religious and the political, on how the 
religious and the political interact and merge in modernity, especially in Nazism. 
Significantly in this respect, the religious appears in Arendt’s work in three different forms. 
First, in the usual sense of the word, as a form of religiosity foreign to the logic of the 
political. Here religion is grounded in a specific sector (the Church) and a special logic 
(faith), that is, religion as Christianity or Jewish faith and the being Christian or Jew (being 
a Jew is something Arendt discusses at length but it is not a discussion that is important in 
this context).  
Second, we have the secularized or political religion. ‘Religion’ in this sense occurs when 
man tries to act as a deity, as sovereign. Transcendence is denied in the attempt to become 
secular God, that is, to become the supreme and unconditioned ruler that can create a world 
without limits of any kind. Nazism and Stalinism are political religions in this sense. This 
political religion is an atheistic religion in its denial of any form of transcendence.  
But there is also a third form of religiosity that we can, following Benjamin, call a weak 
messianism, which, on the one hand, stresses human exposure in relation to something that 
transcends the individual and, on the other hand, accepts that this transcendence can never 
take the form of a divinely ordained authority, of a rule set. Arendt’s thinking of the republic, 
public deliberation, action and natality is infused with this ‘weak messianism’. It is a secular 
transcendence that allows for a given community to stay open towards the coming of the 
new and towards the plurality of human political existence.  
Both the classic understanding of religion, of abiding to religious authorities, and the 
political religion, of abiding to a Führer as a sort of secular God, deny human freedom. Thus, 
Arendt seeks to articulate that which lies beyond the individual on a profane basis, 
positioning herself both in opposition to the earthly sovereignty (the authority) and the divine 
(transcendence). That which transcends them both is the notion of the democratic political 
community: the republic. 
For to live in a political realm with neither authority nor the concomitant awareness 
that the source of authority transcends power and those who are in power, means to be 
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confronted anew, without the religious trust in a sacred beginning and without the 
protection of traditional and therefore self-evident standards of behaviour, but the 
elementary problems of human living-together. (Arendt 1977: 141) 
It is crucial for Arendt to stress that Nazism is not a new religion in so far as it lacks 
transcendence. If one coins this form of religiosity a political religion (or secular religion), 
the emphasis should be on the first word, the political, and on the fact of the this-worldly 
nature of the phenomena. But it is not just a denial of religion as religion, it is in being a 
totalitarian politics also a denial of the very essence of politics. Arendt is therefore highly 
critical of Voegelin’s plea for a new political religion: 
I know that problems of this sort can be avoided if one interprets totalitarian 
movements as a new – and perverted – religion, a substitute for the lost creed of 
traditional beliefs. From this, it would follow that some ‘need for religion’ is a cause 
of the rise of totalitarianism. I feel unable to follow even the very qualified from in 
which Professor Voegelin uses the concept of a secular religion. There is no 
substitute for God in totalitarian ideologies – Hitler’s use of the ‘Almighty’ was a 
concession to what he himself believed to be a superstition. More than that, the 
metaphysical place for God has remained empty. The introduction of these semi-
theological arguments in the discussion of totalitarianism, on the other hand, is only 
too likely to further the wide-spread and strictly blasphemous modern ‘ideas’ about 
a God who is ‘good for you’ – for your mental or other health, for the integration of 
your personality, and God knows what – that is, ‘ideas’ which make of God a 
function of man or society. This functionalization seems to me in many respects the 
last and perhaps the most dangerous stage of atheism.’ (Arendt 1993: 406-7) 
 
And she continues:  
 
‘Those [Voegelin among others] who conclude from the frightening events of our 
times that we have got to go back to religion and faith for political reasons seem to 
me to show just as much lack of faith in God as their opponents’ (ibid.: 407) 
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So, what does (a politics of) real faith imply? Neither a sacralization of politics in the form 
of a political religion, nor a complete functionalization of religion which is the essence of 
atheism and which have been seen historically in the form of Nazis’ and Stalinist regimes. 
Politics and religion should not become one and the same thing, a constitutive difference 
should be kept open. And the interval and openness, resisting becoming the same while 
insisting on the difference and on the importance of transcendence for politics, we call a 
weak messianism. Arendt’s take on religion and politics is one of profanation which is a 
gesture that is as indebted to religion (or perhaps better theology, that is transcendence, but 
not in the form of a specific religious orientation) as it is to politics. It is a form of critique – 
and of action and community – that could not be thought of without some form of 
transcendence. So, essentially everything hinges on what ‘weakness’ here means. It is 
especially in order to clarify this in a non-speculative manner that we should read Arendt in 
relation to other thinkers of politics and religion today such as Vogelin, Derrida, Lefort, 
Agamben, Benjamin and Taubes.  It is by investigating this weak messianism and its political 
negation in Nazism that Arendt makes it convincingly clear that some form of transcendence 
should still be respected.  
We address Arendt’s political theology in four phases. First, we briefly dwell on Arendt’s 
methodology. Then we discuss why interrogating Nazism is central to examine the 
relationship between politics and religion in modernity. This is followed by a discussion of 
Nazism as a type of political religion. We focus here on totalitarianism both as an idea and 
actual institution, the concentration camp. We conclude with an assessment of Arendt’s 
weak messianism. 
 
The burden of our time 
The Nazi horrors, of course, raise the question of how it could happen. But the problem is 
that, when one tries to answer this type of question, any explanation turns into an excuse. 
But Nazism was not inevitable. The German romantic tradition, 1930’s crisis, anti-Semitism 
and the fetishization of the State were among the factors that made Nazism possible. But 
romanticism is not Nazism, anti-Semitism is not the same as genocide, and technology first 
becomes fatal when it is used in the context of warfare and genocide (see Arendt 2003: 20). 
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For the same reason, Arendt was never completely satisfied with the title of her masterpiece, 
The Origins of Totalitarianism. An alternative title, which was also used for the first version 
of the English release, was The Burden of Our Time (Crick 1997). There were several reasons 
why Arendt preferred this title.  
First of all, the idea of an origin marked a kind of causality, suggesting that the seeds of 
Nazism were existent in German history and thus reducing history to the unfolding of 
necessity. Such evolutionism was incompatible with Arendt’s philosophy, which had the 
human capacity of action as its focal point. Her analysis of Nazism is not really a piece of 
history, it is an investigation in to a specific form of the political, into politics in the very 
form of denial of politics (freedom). In her reply to Eric Voegelin review of Origins of 
Totalitarianism, she writes:  
‘Thus my first problem was how to write historically about something – totalitarianism 
– which I did not want to conserve but, on the contrary, felt engaged to destroy. My 
way of solving this problem has given rise to the reproach that the book was lacking 
in unity. What I did – and what I might have done anyway because of my previous 
training and the way of my thinking – was to discover the chief elements of 
totalitarianism and to analyze them in historical terms, tracing these elements back in 
history as far as I deemed proper and necessary. That is, I did not write a history of 
totalitarianism but an analysis in terms of history; I did not write a history of anti-
Semitism or of imperialism, but analyzed the element of Jew-hatred and the element 
of expansion insofar as these elements were still clearly visible and played a decisive 
role in the totalitarian phenomenon itself. The book, therefore, does not really deals 
with the ‘origins’ of totalitarianism – as its title unfortunate claims – but gives a 
historical account of the elements which crystallized into totalitarianism; this account 
is followed by an analysis of the elemental structure of totalitarian movements and 
domination itself’.  
Second, the title The Burden of Our Time underlines that what Arendt was interested in was 
the present and not the past history for its own sake. That it has happened means that it can 
happen again (Arendt 2003: 23). Third, and finally, Nazism was also a burden in a more 
palpable sense. Arendt wrote her book immediately after the Second World War. 
Surprisingly, a reckoning with those who were Nazis is virtually absent in the book. It came 
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first with the book on Eichmann. But there are two other groups that are strongly criticized 
in the book: the modern mass, those who flow with the current and only exhibit apathy in 
relation to the political, and the Jews, whose idea of being elected isolated them from the 
rest of the society and to some extent mirrored the Nazi racial propaganda.  
Arendt’s method was via negativa. It was precisely by analyzing the destruction of all 
humanity that Arendt saw what constituted the human as human and as a political individual. 
Indeed, ‘it was by descending into hell, into the abyss that had opened up, in ‘dwelling on 
horrors’ of the concentration camps, that Arendt was able to see so lucidly what is 
fundamental and vital for action, politics and living a human life’ (Bernstein 1996: 99). Only 
later Arendt attempted to articulate this common humanity positively. Thus, we have two 
types of works: those concerning Nazism and of the destruction of the humanity, such as The 
Origins and Eichmann, and those which, like Life of the Mind and The Human Condition, 
try to articulate human capacities and potentials in positive terms. In order to explicate 
Arendt’s political theology, we must relate to both types of works. These books deal with, 
on the one hand, a politics of death (Nazism, Stalinism, the camp system) and a politics of 
life (natality, being in common, the republic) on the other, and with political religion and 
weak messianism as their justificatory horizon.  
  
Creatio ex nihilio 
It is commonly held that the idea of God does not seem compatible with modernity, with 
expert-scientific ideals and capitalist/utilitarian ideologies. However, the rejection of 
religion does not amount to a consistent atheism. With secularization, the energies redeemed 
by religion do not disappear. In this respect Arendt makes it clear that secularization is not 
enough to get rid of religion. A utilitarian world, which has ‘deprived individual life of its 
immortality’ (Arendt 1973: 320) is prone to new, this-worldly illusions, even new gods and 
idols. In a secular world, the modern mass may fall back upon a religious mood – but no 
longer via an awareness of a constitutive guilt, of limitations and insufficiency but a political 
religion in which one starts to behave like a secular divinity. 
That modernity has given birth to a type of malice of unprecedented dimensions is primarily 
due to the fact that the modern man has lost faith in the immortality of the soul. The masses 
no longer fear hell and no longer have an absolute and transcendent criterion for justice 
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(Arendt 1973: 446-7). Consequently, both paradise and hell turn into categories to be 
realized on earth. Nazism emerged in this context as a pseudo religion, as a religion without 
transcendence but with an earthly paradise (Thousand Year Reich) and hell (the 
concentration camp). A religion, where God is incarnated in people or in the Führer, the 
devil in the Jews. As such, the Nazi pseudo-religion was an answer to the orientation crisis 
of modernity, to the rootlessness of the masses (Ibid). This paradise and this hell are a ‘flat’ 
version without the proper religious transcendence. In her reply to Eric Voegelin, Arendt 
writes:  
When I used the image of Hell, I did not mean this allegorical but literally: it seems 
rather obvious that men who have lost their faith in Paradise will not be able to 
establish it on earth; but it is not so certain that those who have lost their belief in Hell 
as a place of the hereafter may not be willing and able to establish on earth exact 
imitations of what people used to believe about Hell. In this sense I think that a 
description of the camps as Hell on earth is more ‘objective,’ that is, more adequate to 
their essence than statements of a purely sociological or psychological nature. (Arendt 
1994: 404) 
When belief in a divine transcendence disappears there opens up a space for the totalitarian 
state. The ‘totalitarian’ must in this sense not only be understood as non-democratic, but also 
as a new phenomenon that differs from the classical despotism as defined rule without law 
by being a rule by law. With the totalitarian law, the distinction between human and divine 
rule disappears. Hence Führer’s words, for Eichmann, amounted to a divine law (Arendt 
2003: 43). In this sense, in Nazism, religion becomes plastic, it become an instrument used 
to subdue the masses. The same applies to the human nature; understood no longer as a 
limitation or condition, the human nature becomes something one can master and shape at 
will. Being bound to one’s nature and having unlimited freedom amounts to one and the 
same in so far as the Arian essence is to create ex nihilio. And it is the secularization itself 
that enables this sacralization of the state, the race and the Führer.  
As such, the idea of playing God is intimately connected with totalitarianism. But it should 
be noted that the concept of totalitarianism is, in many respects, problematic, and we must 
therefore clarify our own and Arendt’s use. One can distinguish between two understandings 
of totalitarianism, corresponding to the two levels of the political. The first, and the most 
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common, is to understand totalitarianism as an institutional system in which total control is 
exercised. The total state is one in which there is no space for action and no freedom. But 
such a state has never existed. Even Nazism was far from being totalitarian in this sense. The 
relations between the Nazi organizations were often opaque, and the coordination between 
them deficient. Organizations constantly competed with each other, and which was to win was 
far from predetermined. One can speak of a kind of institutional Darwinism, where the 
individual institutions struggled for the Führer’s favour (Arendt 1973: 368, 413). Further, this 
conceptualization of totalitarianism is problematic also because it is often used as an excuse 
for inaction rather than as an explanation. Hence Eichmann could argue that he only did what 
he could not avoid doing. If he had not executed the orders, another would have been put in 
his place. A state has, however, never total control over its subjects. There is always an 
opportunity to do something.  
However, it is it not the case that Arendt did not draw on this first understanding of 
totalitarianism. She does that especially in relation to the restriction of the rights and 
freedoms of the Jews (see Arendt 2003: 33). The point is rather that Arendt is not especially 
original here. Therefore, her use of the term in the second sense is of particular interest and 
especially in relation to our discussion of political religion and political theology. In this 
second sense the concept refers to the notion of self-creation, to the fact that the state, the 
people or the Führer, is given without reference to anything other than itself. As such, the 
concept is in tune with what Jean-Luc Nancy would call immanentism (1991: 56-57). 
Totalitarianism as immanence is the denial of any transcendence, be it in the thinking of the 
community, the law, obligation or responsibility. Totalitarianism in this prism is an ambition 
to eradicate everything that cannot be subsumed under a given project, replacing the endless 
dialectic of history with the notion of a goal that realizes itself in history. Thus, in Nazism, 
the law of race becomes the measure of everything else; in Stalinism, the laws of history. 
What we have here is a political-theological understanding of totalitarianism in contrast to 
the first, more institutional definition. 
Crucially, propaganda, the totalitarian spectacle, plays a crucial role in this context. 
Propaganda is necessary for totalitarianism for it exists ‘in a world which is itself 
nontotalitarian’ (Arendt 1973: 342). Propaganda is its totalizing instrument based on 
‘sheer imagination’ (Ibid. 371) fuelled by a ‘contempt for facts’ (Ibid. xxxii), and aims at 
creating ‘a perfect world of appearances’ (Ibid. 371):  
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Before they seize power and establish a world according to their doctrines, 
totalitarian movements conjure up a lying world of consistency which is more 
adequate to the needs of the human mind than reality itself; in which, through sheer 
imagination, uprooted masses can feel at home and are spared the never-ending 
shocks which real life and real experiences deal to human beings and their 
expectations. (Arendt 1973: 353) 
Debord was to describe the spectacle as ‘the material construction of the religious 
illusion’ (1983: 20). Similarly, in Arendt, we have a perception of the totalitarian 
spectacle as superstition, which always originates in irrational, imaginary fears and 
unrealistic hopes. Superstition is grounded in ‘imagination’, in treating non-existing 
things as if they exist (Spinoza 1993: 55). In Arendt, too, superstition is a consequence of 
being subjected to one’s passions. 
But superstition is not only an epistemological matter. There is an intrinsic relation 
between superstition and despotism. Though, unlike past despotisms, totalitarianism is a 
rule by law. Not a law in the traditional sense, something that restricts the individual, but 
instead a flexible law which is constantly re-created in its application. The totalitarian 
movement identifies itself with the law’s source. Arendt emphasizes that the totalitarian 
movement is always in motion; its movement becomes the law. The law ceases to be 
territorialized as something which delimits, and turns into something that realizes itself 
in history through this de-territorialization. And yet totalitarianism is not nihilism. The 
law is still something which must be obeyed and which asserts itself with a ruthless logic. 
Indeed, the law’s imperative, territorial de-limitation, unfolds in totalitarianism as 
escalating terror (Arendt 1973: 465).  
By lawful government we understand a body politic in which positive laws are needed 
to translate and realize the immutable ius naturale or the eternal commandments of 
God into standards of right and wrong. Only in these standards, in the body of positive 
laws of each country, do the ius naturale or the Commandments of God achieve their 
political reality. In the body politic of totalitarian government, this place of positive 
laws is taken by total terror, which is designed to translate into reality the law of 
movement of history or nature. (Arendt 1973: 463) 
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Nazism was ‘religious’ in a more conventional sense, too. That National Socialism used 
many religious metaphors is widely known. This use cannot be explained as merely an 
expression of cynicism and power politics. Nazism tried to create a new Church: Mein Kampf 
would be the new Bible and Der Führer the new Prophet who brings the revelation further. 
Likewise, the dishonourable Christian cross, a symbol of suffering and failure, is replaced 
with the swastika (see Goux 1980: 4). Essential in any religion is the notion of the divine 
and sublime, an instance, which values human life, turning it into a part of a larger goal. 
Hitler writes in Mein Kampf: 
Any idea may be a source of danger if it be looked upon as an end in itself, when really 
it is only the means to an end. For me and for all genuine National-Socialists there is 
only one doctrine. PEOPLE AND FATHERLAND. What we have to fight for is the 
necessary security for the existence and increase of our race and people, the 
subsistence of its children and the maintenance of our racial stock unmixed, the 
freedom and independence of the Fatherland; so that our people may be enabled to 
fulfil the mission assigned to it by the Creator. (Hitler 1966: 148) 
The Nazi were ‘called’, they were the people who must realize God’s Kingdom on Earth 
(the thousand year reich). That this is the Nazi’s mission must be understood in the light of 
the imagined rivalry between the German and the Jewish people. Many have thus understood 
the symbolism of National Socialism in relation to the jealousy, which the Arians felt 
towards the Jews as God’s elected people (Rubenstein 1990; Hansen 1982; Goux 1980). The 
paradisiacal life, which Hitler was to bring back to the Germans, had the character of a life 
in accordance with the Aryan nature. The divine body in National Socialism was thus not as 
Yahweh or the Christian God, transcendent, but instead present as nature. It’s not faith, 
creating man, but man as race, which ‘creates’ the faith. God is in man, when it follows the 
laws of nature. God’s will is revealed in the German blood.  
According to Hitler’s chief ideologue Rosenberg’s opus magnum, ‘The Myth of the 
Twentieth Century’, the Jewish belief that God created the world, as separate from himself, 
is objectionable. He contrasted this idea with the Aryan religion, in which the human being 
is constituted in its struggle against chaos. The principle for the structuring of this chaos was 
nature itself. This nature lived in man, expressed in the form of races (Pois 1986: 42). The 
religious, as such, expressed itself in man qua race, and the Jewish-Christian divide between 
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spirit and matter was thereby reconciled. The notion that human beings were equal before 
God or arose from the same source (from the monkey) was nonsense. Only the Aryans had 
the opportunity to live a dignified life in accordance with their qualities as mythically 
creative race. This life was an obligation, and any non-Aryan act was to desecrate God’s 
creation (Hitler 1966: 182). An example of an atrocity could be artificially keeping the weak 
alive (Ibid. 98). Humanism was an expression of an unnatural, therefore un-Aryan, attempt 
to intervene in nature. You cannot resist nature, neither your own. No matter what disguise 
one uses, one’s true essence will express itself (Ibid. 192) 
In short, religion is for Nazism a religion of race, a religion where the divine is in the race. 
By the same token, human individuality and capacity to act are denied. The human is reduced 
to a carrier of tendencies. The Nazi way of choosing enemies reveals their contempt for the 
human being as an actor, as a responsible moral agent. The extermination of the Jews was 
not grounded in what the Jews had done but in what they were (Arendt 2003: 33). In the 
previous forms of despotism people were killed if they threatened the powers to be. The 
Jews, in contrast, were killed because they existed. People were no longer judged on their 
actions, as individuals. Agency and plurality became irrelevant. Thus, Nazism and Stalinism 
were a crime against the fundamental human condition as such, the human plurality; against 
‘the fact that men, not man, live on the earth and inhabit the world’ (Arendt 1989: 7). 
  
Evil – radical and banal 
Arendt’s political theology is most visible regarding the conceptualization of radical evil and 
the camps, which she saw as a manifestation of radical evil. Of radical evil she writes that it 
occurs in a system where man has become superfluous: where one person allows herself to 
be replaced with another, as if they were things (Arendt 1973: 438, 457). This fundamental 
violation of humanity surpasses the standards of any previous evil, which is why it is 
‘radical’. Arendt considers that we are without critical grip when we need to describe this 
evil. The philosophical tradition and Christianity have in the past always understood evil as 
given by a defect, as a secondary phenomenon (Arendt 1973: 459). On the other hand, the 
Holocaust expresses a decided ill-will that cannot be explained in other ways than that is 
simply evil. It is not ‘pathological’ but grounded in blind rule following, an evil which has 
no interest but the realization of a divinely given plan.  
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Arendt’s thesis on radical evil consists of several interrelated elements. Firstly, she argues 
that radical evil is radical for it transcends human sense. It is also radical in the sense of 
being unforgivable, as something that one cannot reconcile oneself with (Arendt 1973: 433, 
459; 1994: 13-14). This claim is not based on the number of deaths but on the fact that there 
was no justification for killing Jews. Which is the second reason why radical evil is radical. 
The Holocaust broke with any utilitarian doctrine and with the notion that the human being 
had an intrinsic value. The camp, the ‘guiding idea’ of totalitarianism (Arendt 1973: 438), is 
also a symbol of this radical evil: 
It is not only the non-utilitarian character of the camps themselves – the senselessness 
of ‘punishing’ completely innocent people, the failure to keep them in a condition so 
that profitable work might be extorted from them, the superfluousness of frightening 
a completely subdued population – which gives them their distinctive and disturbing 
qualities, but their  anti-utilitarian function, the fact that not even the supreme 
emergencies of military activities were allowed to interfere with these ‘demographic 
policies.’ It was as though the Nazis were convinced that it was of greater importance 
to run extermination factories than to win a war. (Arendt 1994: 233) 
Radical evil is an evil out of principle: an evil, the Nazi were prepared to take to extremes 
even though they knew that it would eventually lead their own downfall. Indeed, the Nazi 
did not decrease but increased the speed of the exterminations when they understood that 
they were to lose the war. In this way crucial resources were drained, which otherwise could 
have been used in combat. Thirdly, radical evil was radical because it did the human beings 
redundant. It was an attack on the humanity of the human being. Thus, when Agamben 
claims that the Holocaust is indescribable, it is with reference to Arendt’s and Levi’s 
understanding of the Holocaust as an event that goes beyond the limits of any previously 
seen evil. Many have cited this central stanza from Arendt’s Essays in Understanding:  
Before that we said: Well, one has enemies. That is entirely natural. Why shouldn’t 
a people have enemies? But this was different. It was really as if an abyss had opened. 
Because we had the idea that amends could somehow be made for everything else, 
as amends can be made for just about everything at some point in politics. But not 
for this. This ought not to have happened. (Arendt 1994: 13-14) 
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The camps verified the politics of Nazism, the essence of which was to make the impossible 
possible. As God created the earth out of nothing, the Nazis created their world by their own 
efforts. The Aryan essence or nature was their creative force. Owing nothing to anybody, 
they were their own masters. The camps, along the same lines, were the result of a freedom 
of action, which did not justify itself with reference to anything other than the fact that it was 
a sovereign act of will. A distorted perception of self-interest could perhaps explain the 
desire to kill the Jews, but not the systematic humiliation and torture. 
However, radical evil must be thought together with the banality evil in order to understand 
totalitarianism as a system. What was most disturbing in Eichmann’s trial in Jerusalem was 
his claim that in practice he had followed Kant’s categorical imperative. Arendt believed 
that Eichmann’s was an evil emanating not from a will (to do evil) but from a lack of 
thinking, of moral reflection. Eichmann was not a pathological criminal; ‘banality’ was a 
quality of his being rather than of his evil, which was ‘monstrous’ (Arendt 1978: 4). 
Eichmann followed the law, but did so ‘blindly’, without ethical reflection. Eichmann was 
frighteningly normal. The problem was that he did not ‘think’, that is, he was not able to 
reflect morally. He did not have the capacity to put himself in others’ place and thus he did 
not doubt the words of Führer. He was ‘banal’ in the sense of thinking in rigid terms and his 
dependency on others. Except for an extraordinary diligence in looking out for his personal 
advancement, he had no motives at all. And this diligence in itself was in no way criminal; 
he certainly would never have murdered his superior in order to inherit his post. He was not 
stupid. It was sheer thoughtlessness that predisposed him to become one of the greatest 
criminals of his time (Arendt 1992: 287-8). 
Lack of thinking, however, need not, automatically, lead to the inhumane treatment of the 
other. That is, Eichmann’s rigidity may explain his adherence to the Fatherland but not the 
denigration of the Jews. In this regard, Eichmann transposed the distinction between the 
human and the nonhuman onto another distinction, that of between the private and the public. 
In private, he could behave morally; in the public sphere, he behaved instrumentally. As a 
cynic, Eichmann knew very well that the Nazi ideology is a construction, that the Führer was 
not God, and that the Jew was not a devil. Nevertheless, he carried on, in practice, as if these 
were uncontestable truths. On several occasions he even distanced himself from anti-
Semitism. For instance, he claimed several times that he personally had nothing against Jews 
(Ibid. 26). He even helped some Jews privately. However, helping an individual (private) 
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Jew does not immunize one against the (public) ideology. Eichmann’s ‘distance’ did not 
undermine but merely sustained his anti-Semitism. It is precisely through the 
(mis)conception of a ‘I’ outside the reach of ideology that the ideology is sustained. The 
exceptions to the public rule (e.g. helping individual Jews privately) sustain the rule 
(extermination of the Jews). Thus, Eichmann’s world had to stop at the gate to the camp. In 
a way, one could say that in Eichmann and perhaps also in Nazism as such one finds a 
dangerous form of religion: not a stubborn adherence to religious dogma but a religion 
without belief; not a religion that imposes limits grounded in dogma but one that allows for 
an unlimited form of sovereignty.   
 
The concentration camps 
Once the Nazi regime had defined the Jews and the other marginalized groups as objective 
enemies without human qualities, they were brought to the camps to verify this ideology. In 
the camps it was made impossible for the inmates to remain human by eliminating freedom 
and spontaneity. The totalitarian rule is an experiment in breaking down the human 
individuality, in denying the fact that the individual is an irreplaceable and unique human 
being. 
For to destroy individuality is to destroy spontaneity, man's power to begin something 
new out of his own resources, something that cannot be explained on the basis of 
reactions to environment and events. Nothing then remains but ghastly marionettes 
with human faces, which all behave like the dogs of Pavlov's experiments, which all 
react with perfect reliability even when going to their own death, and which do nothing 
but react. (Arendt 1973: 455) 
The camp signifies the reduction of the human beings from actors to reactive bodies. This 
took place in three phases. The first step is to eliminate the Jews’ legal status, which is done 
through a double manoeuvre. On the one hand, they were positioned outside legal protection; 
on the other hand, they were simultaneously subjected to judicial regulation. In this sense 
the camps were not within a criminological domain. The two systems, prisons and camps, 
were kept strictly separated. The suspension of an individual’s legal status was incompatible 
with the status of a prisoner in jail who remains a subject of law. When, later, the Nazi began 
to send criminals, too, to the camps, their difference to other prisoners was always marked.  
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The next step in the elimination of the prisoners was to annihilate them as moral actors. 
Arendt writes that martyrdom no longer makes sense in the camp (1973: 451). In the camps 
all hit the bottom. Those who have escaped this fate did so by stealing from other prisoners, 
by working in the Sonderkommando which kept the death machine running, or by 
performing police functions. It was impossible to maintain one’s dignity and self-respect. 
The prisoners found themselves within what Levi described the gray zone. In this zone the 
differences between executioner and victim, good and evil, worthy and unworthy cease to 
make sense. 
When a man is faced with the alternative of betraying and thus murdering his friends 
or of sending his wife and children, for whom he is in every sense responsible, to their 
death; when even suicide would mean the immediate murder of his own family - how 
is he to decide? The alternative is no longer between good and evil, but between 
murder and murder. Who could solve the moral dilemma of the Greek mother, who 
was allowed by the Nazis to choose which of her three children should be killed? 
(Arendt 1973: 452) 
Another important aspect in the destruction of human morality and the sense of self was the 
lack of space, which prevented the prisoners from having a minimal private life and 
maintaining personal hygiene. Typically, four shared a bed section. The prisoners were so 
close that they often could not remove those who died during the night. One had to fight for 
everything: for space in the bed, for access to latrines, for time at the sink, and so on. In 
Birkenau, for instance, there was one sink per 7,800 prisoners and one latrine per 7,000. 
Prisoners often suffered diarrhoea or dysentery, but they were only allowed to use the latrines 
at certain times and for a maximum of 10 minutes. Thus, everybody came to smell 
excrement, they were extremely dirty and filled with fleas and other parasites. And all this 
was intentional. Thus, one could reduce human beings to untermenschen. Then one could 
say: ‘You see, they are animals, and the worst species, as well. You've been told this. They 
are ugly, they stink, they are weak, they are cowards and they fight each other to eat. No 
aryan would do such a thing’ (Hitler, quoted in Razac 2002: 93-4). In this sense the camp 
was the space of a self-fulfilling ideology. 
The third step consisted in eliminating the prisoners’ individuality and initiative, in reducing 
them to biological bodies. Arendt notes that nothing was worse than watching the prisoners 
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marching to their death like lemmings. There was virtually never any rebellion in the camps. 
This is no more evident than in the so-called ‘muselmann’, whose life was reduced to a 
struggle for survival. The muselmann testifies to the fact that the Nazi’s power stretched out 
longer than to death. The muselmann was living dead, robbed of even his own death. The 
muselmann is a product of the exercise of absolute power. In Hegel’s master-slave dialectic, 
death is the limit of power; when the slave dies, the master’s power over him also ceases. 
The Nazi maintained their power over the Jews even into death. In the camps, no one died 
as individuals but as part of an industrial production of corpses, as a number. 
To reflect upon the different ways to die indicates in itself a (minimal) distance from death. 
In this context it is worth noting that suicide was very rare in the camps. Suicide, after all, is 
a fundamental human act. What makes a human beings human is their ability to start 
something anew, their spontaneity, which Arendt calls natality. Suicide would have been a 
spontaneous action, which broke with the logic of the camp, and thus a minimal form of 
resistance. In the camps even this kind of initiative was denied. A survivor of the camps 
recounts in his memoirs about his attempt to commit suicide by joining a group to be gassed. 
The attempt was discovered by the guards and prevented. As they thrashed him, the guards 
wre crying out: ‘You bloody shit, get it into your stupid head: we decide how long you stay 
alive and when you die, and not you’ (Stark 2001: 97). This despite the fact that their project 
was to eliminate the Jews from the surface of the earth.    
The Nazis thought that everything was possible for them, which found a paradoxical 
expression in their attempt to prove that everything can be destroyed (Arendt 1973:459). The 
camps, in this sense, expressed the idea of creating something out of nothing. It was a 
perverted conception of free action and, for Arendt, this perversion has a religious aspiration. 
The concentration camp is literally a hell on earth. 
 
An atheist religion 
For Arendt the answer to totalitarianism must be political, for only political action, 
accountability and common political institutions can act as a bulwark against the radical evil. 
Protection against this evil does not lie in turning one’s gaze away from this world. On the 
contrary: 
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The hope for man in his singularity lay in the fact that not man but men inhabit the 
earth and form a world between them. It is human worldliness that will save men form 
the pitfalls of human nature. (Arendt 1990: 175) 
Here we come to the final essential element of totalitarianism. We see what we saw in the 
concentration camps, albeit in a less radical form, among the populations of the totalitarian 
systems, the modern masses, who have lost the ability for political reflection and action. 
Although Arendt’s criticism of the Jews is at times very harsh, her main criticism is aimed 
at the many, who, through their inaction and apathy, make totalitarian systems possible. Only 
through political action, which totalitarianism denies outright, we can create a vivid and 
vibrant society. It requires that we do not blindly follow totalitarian ideologies and systems 
of faith or the hope for a future paradisiacal condition. We have an obligation to the world 
as it is here and now.   
Arendt insists on this world. Ours is a secular world that has doubt as its starting point 
(Arendt 1994:369). This secularism is a counter-measure to totalitarianism as a political 
religion. Arendt is opposed to fanaticism, mysticism and romanticism associated with the 
Nazi ‘spirituality.’ But there is another kind of religiosity, where the category of doubt is 
central. Here Arendt makes a distinction between the ethical and the religious, or between 
‘faith’ and ‘belief’.  
Modern religious belief is distinguished from pure faith because it is the ‘belief to 
know’ of those who doubt that knowledge is possible at all. It is noteworthy that the 
great writer who presented to us in so many figures the modern religious tension 
between belief and doubt could show a figure of true faith only in the character of The 
Idiot. Modern religious man belongs in the same secular world as his atheistic 
opponent precisely because he is no ‘idiot’ in it. The modern believer who cannot bear 
the tension between doubt and belief will immediately lose the integrity and the 
profundity of his belief. The justification of the apparent paradox of calling atheism a 
religion, in brief, derived from the mental familiarity of the greatest of modern 
religious thinkers – Pascal, Kierkegaard, Dostoevsky – with atheistic experience. 
(Arendt 1994: 371) 
This zone of uncertainty and undecidability between the religious and the atheistic emerges 
also in Arendt’s understanding of political community. Arendt relates the finality, or the 
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reflection on limits which doubt manifests, to the political community as natality. Action 
and thus freedom arise from the fact that human beings can always begin something anew. 
It is this characteristic that gives the individual its unique character and manifests its 
freedom. Arendt quotes the Bible in this context: ‘Onto us a son is given’ (1978: 247). 
Natality is a weak form of messianism for it does not take the form of sovereignty. It is about 
being in the world without asserting oneself in it (Gottlieb 2003: 139). It’s concerned not 
with production but with action, with activities that point towards and constitute a larger 
community. Arendt unfolds this thought in the form of a critique of Plato. In Plato, the 
beginning (arche) and governing (archein) are intimately connected. The one who governs 
is the creator. In Plato's time, this was seen as completely natural, also because the two words 
stem from the same root. Later, however, the difference between the two meanings has been 
forgotten (Arendt 1973: 224-225). Indeed, it is exactly what happened under Nazism. In 
totalitarianism natality, the ability to start something anew, is subsumed under the Nazi 
movement. Thus, the beginning takes the form of sovereignty through which the beginning 
and governing merge together. Arendt’s project is to separate arche and archein from each 
other, and to think governing, archein, in a new way, on the grounds of human freedom and 
plurality.  
Arendt follows here Judaism; man’s task is not to build a divine empire on earth. Arendt is 
not a milleniarist (Gottlieb 2003: 139). But this does not necessarily mean that she has no 
religious sensibility. Hence her weak messianism where action coincides with a messianic 
figure that ‘is decidedly in the world but not at all of the world – without ever forsaking the 
world for the sake of otherworldly salvation’ (Ibid. 148). Being in the world, but in such a 
way that the individual maintains a commitment to something beyond itself. Salvation is, in 
other words, not beyond but is worldly. To be religious in an atheistic way, the faith must be 
weak. But it is precisely this weakness that enables one to put a distance to political religions. 
As such, Arendt’s weak messianism prefigures Derrida’s ‘messianicity without 
messianism’, a messianicity which does not depend on any messianism, any Abrahamic 
religion, and does not follow any revelation. A messianism, which is not reducible to religion 
through any deconstruction. What is irreducible in ‘messianism without religion’ is an 
experience of the ‘emancipatory promise’ (Derrida 1994: 74). Likewise, in Arendt, the 
promise is grounded in a new beginning. In contrast to religion, the content of this promise 
is not determined. The ‘new’ cannot be foreseen and precisely as such, its absolute newness 
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forecloses in the return of the absolute as a religious figure. The Last Judgment will not 
occur. Non-religious messianism is a promise of the new independent of the monotheistic 
religions. The consequence of which is twofold. First, it becomes both possible and 
necessary to distinguish religion and faith; faith is not reducible to religion just as religion is 
not necessarily faithful. And second, since such messianic faith is a necessary but external 
condition for religion, it follows that that its religious appropriation (sacralization) is not an 
unavoidable process. In other words, profanation becomes possible. 
 
Profanation 
Thus, while Arendt preserves the place of faith, she also ‘profanes’ religion, redefining 
religious terms in immanent terms, as profane relations. Since the origin of the sacred is the 
profane, the appropriation or sacralization of the common world, there is always a possibility 
for profanation, a potential ‘atheism to be extracted from a religion’ (Deleuze and Guattari 
1994: 92). Consider Arendt’s treatment of religious categories such as immortality and 
virtue. Against the postulates of conventional theology Arendt asserts that the soul can be 
immortal through ‘appearance’ in the public sphere, just as true virtue is related to ‘assuming 
a public role’ (1973: 77). In this way, as she profanes the religious concepts while preserving 
their affirmative core, politics becomes an alternative to religion. What religion calls 
‘immortality’ is in fact something this worldly, which is grounded in politics. Effectively, 
‘immortality’ can no longer be considered to be the property of a sovereign God, and 
becomes a common, universal virtue that is immanent. Only when it is captured by religion 
and institutionalized as a ‘sacred’ property of religion, separated from the domain of the 
commons, ‘immortality’ turns into an apparatus of regulation and domination. Seen in this 
prism, the problem Arendt articulates is how to think and act outside the religious apparatus. 
Human life does not have a predetermined purpose; it is the very absence of aim that makes 
it possible for human beings to dedicate themselves to praxis. It is this freedom to act which 
the governmental machine has separated from life and sacralised. But although it has 
captured praxis from within the domain of the profane, religion creates the illusion that the 
possibility of action is enabled by religion. As such, religious appropriation/alienation 
designates not merely an external force (juxtaposed to the profane) but a strategic field of 
formation in which religion seeks to govern the profane itself. Since religion is an apparatus 
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of capture, its power is always in relation with the profane, the world of the commons. 
Therefore, religion can always, in principle, appropriate, or ‘capture’ any idea, any force 
from this domain. Hence the two senses of religion: excluding the profane and appropriating 
it. 
In this sense Arendt is a contemporary case for the political/philosophical re-appropriation 
of religious images. Everything depends, in this procedure, on the notion of immortality: 
overcoming the limitations of one’s biological life through public/political action and 
speech. If we can think of immortality in materialist terms, we have no need for God or for 
the Sovereign. Along the same lines, in a profaned horizon, faith becomes the idiot’s ‘belief 
to know.’ ‘Salvation’ can be understood in terms of political appearance. And ‘evil’ can be 
re-articulated as apolitical blindness, automatic rule-following and the loss of reality. In this 
way, Arendt’s conceptual apparatus opens up the religious imagination to political thought 
and action. Instead of turning her back to religion, Arendt ‘politicizes’ its imaginary truths, 
accommodating them in her own discourse. In the same movement, the promissory aspect 
of religion is re-inscribed in the political tradition. It has absolutely nothing to do with 
Arendt´s Jewishness. It is rather an insistence on a common political future that escapes the 
logic of identity. It is the transcendence of the divine inscribed within the political as that 
which enables and opens for the new. It is not a promise of an otherworldly salvation but 
one to be strived for in this life in and through the political community.  
And yet, the differentiation between religion and politics cannot bring a full reconciliation. 
Religion in Arendt cannot access the political realm without perverting both politics and 
itself. In other words, the relationship between politics and religion cannot be symmetrical. 
Further, two very different understandings of salvation or immortality are juxtaposed here. 
On the one hand, Arendt contends that religion invented the individual immortality on the 
basis of an ‘unpolitical, non-public’ community (1973: 53), but on the other hand, true 
salvation consists in the rediscovery of the idea of immortality in modernity; ‘without this 
transcendence into a potential earthly immortality, no politics’ (1973: 55). And most 
importantly, salvation can be attained in the actual world. In a sense, therefore, Arendt 
demonstrates that there is another, profaned path to salvation which politics alone can 
establish. In this sense Arendt’s philosophy is antagonistic towards religion. Profanation 
necessarily obliterates the religious symbolic hierarchy. If one can be immortal for rational 
reasons, for reasons other than obeying divine commands, then politics itself can become a 
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way of life. Consequently, one could say, politics in Arendt not only tends but also intends 
to take the place of religion by re-appropriating its terrain. 
In short, then, seen as a disjunctive relation, doubt (reason) and faith are, first, different and 
irreducible to one another, but they can co-exist in the domain of profane politics. Second, 
they can conflict with one another (as is the case with superstition versus natality). And 
finally, each is necessary. It is significant in this framework that the polarization between 
politics and religion, between political freedom and political-theological authority, is not 
only an antagonism but also a relation of agonistic action and speech. 
 
Conclusion 
But we must recall that the relation of appropriation runs both ways. Just as politics could 
lead to profanation, to re-appropriation of the commons from the domain of the sacred, what 
is common is always prone to be appropriated or captured by religion or political religion. 
Such appropriation is what lies in the origin of totalitarianism. The difference between 
profanation and secularization is essential in this respect: 
Secularization is a form of repression. It leaves intact the forces it deals with by simply 
moving them from one place to another. Thus, the political secularization of 
theological concepts (the transcendence of God as a paradigm of sovereign power) 
does nothing but displace the heavenly monarchy onto an earthly monarchy, leaving 
its power intact. Profanation, however, neutralizes what it profanes. Once profaned, 
that which was unavailable and separate loses its aura and is returned to use. Both are 
political operations: the first guarantees the exercise of power by carrying it back to a 
sacred model; the second deactivates the apparatuses of power and returns to common 
use the spaces that power had seized. (Agamben 2007: 77) 
Nazism’s political theology is paradigmatic with respect to secularization for it regards 
modern political concepts as secularized derivatives of theological concepts which re-
introduce the transcendent, magical into modern politics. In this sense secularization is 
ultimately a religious category. To be sure, the paradigmatic theorist in this context is Carl 
Schmitt who has claimed that ‘all significant concepts’ of modern political theory are merely 
‘secularized theological concepts’ (1985: 36). Modern politics consists in re-instating the 
essentials of theology in a modern context, translating ‘devil’ into ‘enemy’ for instance, 
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‘miracle’ into ‘decision’, and so on. Even modern revolts and revolutions, in this prism, bear 
the mark of theology; ‘Prometheus arises in the shadow of Christ’ (Taubes 2009: 89). 
In the context Arendt’s work performs a profane intervention into the problem of religion in 
modernity. She shows that political theology has always already been a political theory of 
power. The history of religion demonstrates the way in which a political theory of power 
and government has emerged in the guise of theology. In this sense one could claim that, 
contra Schmitt, all concepts of theology are political. If, in this prism, modern political theory 
has any significance, it is its attempt to profane the religio-theological mindset. As evidenced 
again and again, this mindset is deeply rooted in our culture and still defines the human 
condition today. Its strength is what proves why profanation is a significant category. And 
herein lies the real significance of Arendt’s work today as an intervention into the problem 
of religion in modernity at a time that contemplates the ‘return of religion’ with an intriguing 
passivity. 
Arendt criticized the political religion fiercely. She thought obligation as an obligation to 
this world. And she sat natality as a response to the totalitarian destruction of the human 
world. Nazism sought to destroy this world, but every ending contains a possibility of a new 
beginning. The birth for Arendt is exactly something that points beyond the individual. As 
such it also holds a form of spirituality. It is therefore also crucial that Arendt ends her book 
on totalitarianism with a quotation from Augustine: 
Intitum ut esset homo creatus est – ‘that a beginning be made man was created’ said 
Augustine. This beginning is guaranteed by each new birth; it is indeed every man. 
(Arendt 1973: 479) 
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